Zero-Trust Authorization and Discovery for Enterprise MCP
Quick summary
arXiv:2609.22573v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents translate natural-language context, which may include attacker-controlled text, into privileged tool calls, so authorization must remain effective even when an agent is prompt-injected or adversarially steered. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a widely adopted interface for this boundary, yet its official SDKs' authentication and authorization primitives fall short of enterprise zero-trust requirements, most acutely a dual-persona model in which one server must serve human users (corporate SSO) and automated agents (servic
Key takeaways
- arXiv:2609.22573v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents translate natural-language context, which may include attacker-controlled text, into privileged tool calls, so authorization must remain effective even when an agent is prompt-injected or adversarially steered.
- The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a widely adopted interface for this boundary, yet its official SDKs' authentication and authorization primitives fall short of enterprise zero-trust requirements, most acutely a dual-persona model in which one server must serve human users (corporate SSO) and automated agents (servic
Why it matters
“Zero-Trust Authorization and Discovery for Enterprise MCP” should be evaluated beyond branding and benchmark scores. Its practical importance will emerge in task accuracy, latency, unit cost, safety and integration with real workflows.
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