Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools
Quick summary
arXiv:2601.17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities. In this setting, independently maximizing the minimum endowment-normalized utility in each round satisfies sharing incentives (agents weakly prefer participating in the mechanism to not participating), strategyproofness (agents have no incentive to misreport their demands), and Pareto efficiency. However, this max-min mechanism can lead to large disparities in the total resources received by agents, even when they have th
Key takeaways
- arXiv:2601.17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities.
- In this setting, independently maximizing the minimum endowment-normalized utility in each round satisfies sharing incentives (agents weakly prefer participating in the mechanism to not participating), strategyproofness (agents have no incentive to misreport their demands), and Pareto efficiency.
- However, this max-min mechanism can lead to large disparities in the total resources received by agents, even when they have th
Why it matters
The value of this work lies as much in how it was tested as in the claim itself. Sample design, baselines, uncertainty and replication help separate a laboratory result from real-world impact.
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