No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
Quick summary
arXiv:2408.10077v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal a
Key takeaways
- arXiv:2408.10077v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers.
- No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases.
- In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d.
Why it matters
“No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects” highlights the need for repeatable measurement rather than a single impressive demonstration. Independent validation across datasets and clearly stated limitations determine whether a result can guide product decisions.
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